<\/span><\/h3>\nAn employee in a banking back\u2011office set up automatic forwarding of her work mailbox to a personal Gmail account for convenience. Later, her credentials were compromised, and large volumes of internal transaction and payment data were exfiltrated. The organisation had no policy to block auto\u2011forwarding or monitor forwarding rules. After the incident, they disabled auto\u2011forwarding by default, instituted DLP scans of mailbox rules, and audited internal email traffic monthly.<\/p>\n
<\/span>Case Study\u202fC \u2013 Internal Email Contains Unencrypted Financial Attachments<\/span><\/h3>\nA corporate treasury department frequently used email to distribute unencrypted Excel spreadsheets with payment instructions, IBANs and SWIFT codes to internal teams and external vendors. One email thread was accidentally sent to a vendor\u2019s external contact list, exposing multiple bank account numbers. The organisation then implemented mandatory encryption for emails with payment\/sensitive attachments, introduced classification labels (e.g., \u201cConfidential\u202f\u2013\u202fPayments\u201d), and enforced that any such email must go via a secure messaging portal instead of standard email.<\/p>\n
\n